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campaign manager accompanying the Senator on his trips to Israel and the Soviet Union. From
1980 to 1981 he served as senior advisor to Ed Muskie when he became Secretary of State.
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Transcript
Don Nicoll: It is Tuesday, the 30th of April. We are in Washington, D.C. in the law offices of
Berl Bernhard, and Don Nicoll is interviewing Mr. Bernhard. Berl, would you give us your full
name, spell it, your date, place of birth, and the names of your parents?
Berl Bernhard: Alright, name is Berl Bernhard, B-E-R-L, B-E-R-N-H-A-R-D, birth
September 7, 1929. My father's name was Morris or Maurice Bernhard, my mother's name was
Celia Nadele, N-A-D-E-L-E.
DN:

And you were born where?

BB: In New York City.
DN:

Did you grow up in New York?

BB: No, I never lived in New York. My mother got caught short in New York. We lived in
New Jersey for a long time, in Englewood, went to school there. And then my parents, when I
was in eighth grade or so, moved down to Marathon, Florida. My father, who had been, who
was originally from Vienna, Austria, had gone to law school, became a lawyer and a banker in
New Jersey, disliked his profession quite significantly and loudly, and ended up just turning it all
over and moved down to Marathon and bought fifteen acres of land. We were the first people I

think with any real interest in developing that island, and built a fishing resort called Tarpon
Lodge and they stayed down there for twenty, twenty-five years. I didn't, I didn't like the heat, I
liked the sailing. I didn't like the fishing because it was, I ran their charter boat for three
summers and I hated every bit of it because people came down, always got seasick. It was not
pleasant.
DN:

Now this was, when did they move?

BB: They moved down to Marathon, it was probably right after World War II, 1946, and then
started to develop this property. And it was not what you would call a high tone place. It was
basically established as a fishing resort but it grew some and it became a very nice spot.
DN:

They moved about the time you were graduating from high school.

BB: Well, a little before that actually. They had planned to do that. When I talked about '46,
that was the actual move, but prior to that they were already, my father was already moving
down there and we were beginning to go, shuffle back and forth on a transitional basis.
DN:

And where did you go to college?

BB: I went to Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, and I graduated in 1951. Just
finished my fiftieth celebration, if you want to call it that, some people say reunion. And then
after that I went to Yale Law School, got out in '54.
DN:

You went directly to Yale.

BB:

Yeah, I did.

DN: Now, you tell us that your father hated the law and banking, but you went into the
profession.
BB: It's strange, I really was quite uncertain about it. I debated whether to go to the Fletcher
School, which I had applied to, and I wasn't quite sure what I wanted to do. So I applied to
Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, Fletcher School at Tufts and to Yale Law
School. And when I got into Yale Law School I said, “Well, it gives me more options.” So I
decided to do that. And Yale turned out to be a good choice because it was less concerned with
the miniscule aspects of the law, although you had to have some of the basics, the fundamentals.
But it was possible to take things for, like the jurisprudence of East and West, and some very
philosophical kinds of things. And it basically taught some discipline in thinking as opposed to
just rote, footnotes, Martindale-Hubbell (sounds like: “shepardizing paces” ----unintelligible
phrase) and that kind of thing. And so it was a good place, and I was fortunate to be there.
My dad was beginning to get low on money and I ended up teaching for a semester and a half in
the undergraduate school at Yale, as a graduate instructor of political science. And that was too
bad for the kids at Yale, but that's the way the school worked in those days. The full professor
would teach one day a week, and the graduate assistants would have two days a week. And it

was, it seemed to work for them but it was, publish was the main issue, not teach. I think it was
a mistake. Quite frankly, I think Dartmouth did a better job on undergraduate teaching than
Yale, but that's a debate that they're having.
DN:

Now, where did you go after you graduated from Yale?

BB: I was fortunate, I got a job as a law clerk to Judge Luther [Wallace] Youngdahl, who had
been one, in the federal district court, District of Columbia. It was an interesting opportunity
because he had been chief justice of the supreme court of Minnesota and governor two terms.
He ended up coming to Washington only because Hubert Humphrey had decided that if Luther
Youngdahl ran against him, he'd [Youngdahl] win. And so he got Truman to appoint him to the
U.S. District Court here. And it was a wonderful period for me because it was intended to be
one year, but could be extended by the judge if there were a need.
And it turned out to be extended because we were in the middle of the Owen [J.] Lattimore case
and it was a very hot issue. It was the McCarthy period, and Owen Lattimore had been indicted
for committing perjury when he said he wasn't a follower of Communist lines or adherence to
Communist causes, and it was, we hadn't seen anything quite like this. Leo (name) was the U.S.
attorney and Herb Brownell was attorney general. It was a, I think, a very unfortunate, I would
say, extension of the McCarthy mentality, to try to suppress free speech. And the upshot of it
was that we dismissed the perjury indictments, and there were a number of counts, on the
grounds that it violated the First Amendment. And it went up to the court of appeals, and while
it was there I thought we had a good shot at losing. And the chief justice died, who was opposed
to the position, and we were sustained on a four to four vote. But it did come back for another
time. And this time they filed for a very unusual motion of bias and prejudice against the judge,
on the grounds that he had shown in his first opinion that he was biased against the government.
And we dismissed the thing on the grounds that you had to show bias and prejudice beyond the
four walls of the case, that he had done something that showed he was prejudiced against the
government. But it was a hell of a time and extended therefore for two years.
And we had some wonderful cases, including the rights of the courts, civilian courts, to review
the nature of military discharge certificates, that kind of thing. He was a very good guy. And I
have to say, I never really talked about this, some of the cases in which we were involved ended
up with certain discussions that took place between Luther Youngdahl and his very close friend
Earl Warren, because they were both Republican governors and they were both of a liberal bent
for the Republican party, and they used to have many discussions. And at the same time, David
[L.] Bazelon, who was on the U.S. Court of Appeals here, was a close friend of the judge's
because they were involved in many mental health activities. And there was much discussions
between them on cases. So it was a really interesting time for me.
DN:

And you had an opportunity to sit in on those conversations?

BB: Yes, and I'll tell you, some of the, one of the more enjoyable things that came about as a
result of that was that I got to know a fellow named Milton [S.] Kronheim, who was a liquor
distributor and a very active Democrat. And he used to have these little lunches over at his
delicatessen and, in north-northeast Washington. And he used to invite all of his friends, and

Thurgood Marshall would come over there, and all kinds of people would come up there. And I
got to know a number of the justices, particularly Brennan. And it was, I learned more about
how some of these cases are decided, which one doesn't always see.
DN:

But I take it you were never tempted to seek a judicial career.

BB: You know, I thought about that a number of times. And the problem was, and I'm still not
sure exactly why because once or twice it had been proposed that I should try to do that. But I
always found other things that attracted me immediately and seemed to be more of a challenge.
May be wrong, I'm not sure I would have been a very good sitter for a sustained period of time.
I know I did not enjoy the motions calendar when I was law clerk as much as I did the criminal
and civil trials, as such. And I thought, well, there's going to be an awful lot of that listening.
And I enjoyed drafting opinions, that was a lot of fun. But it just was something that, you know,
you either feel it or you don't feel it, and I didn't feel it. And so I thought there were so many
other things that interested me, that I just never focused on it.
DN:

When you finished your clerkship, what attracted you first?

BB: After that? Well, what attracted me was that I was looking around for a job and I knew I
needed a job, and I had worked in New York for a summer at (sounds like: Davis, Polk,
Wardwell, Sunderland & Kendall), as it was known then. And that was an interesting time
because it was when John W. Davis was, had agreed to argue Brown vs. Board of Education.
And since I'd written my senior thesis at Dartmouth on John Marshall Harlan, who had written
the dissent, and plus he beat Ferguson in a “separate but equal” issues, I wasn't much inclined to
be helpful. And I turned down an opportunity to work on the briefs with John W. Davis. And I
had some interesting, unfortunate discussions with a fellow named D. Nelson Adams, who was
kind of running the firm at the time, who at one point told me that: did I feel that working on this
case, despite my previous position, would turn me into a whore? And I said I didn't look at it
that way. And he leaned over in this very snide way and said, “You could became a very
wealthy one.” And in any event, I was invited to go back there after law school but I didn't, I
had the clerkship, I never returned there.
But I decided I didn't want to go with a big law firm. And one of my classmates at law school,
Harris Wofford, he and I had become close friends, studying for the Bar together down here at
Gary Gessel's (could not verify last name spelling, unless he is the CFO of the Milgard Co.)
house, because they were old friends and Harris had worked as a law clerk there. And Gary, I
got to know him because I was living over at his house for two weeks. And he asked me if I
wanted to go to, come over to Covington and Burling [law firm name]. And I said, well, I didn't,
because it was a big firm and I had had that experience. I didn't want to do that.
And one day he called me up and he said, “You know, there's a small firm that is coming along
pretty well, and a fellow named Jack Tierney” ( I knew from Yale Law School and he was one of
the heads of the firm), “you ought to go see him.” Well, I went there and it turned out to be very
fortunate because I met Jim Verner and later he and I started this firm, and Gene Liipfert, they
were both practicing over there, and it was a good time. And then Jim Neil, who later became
the prosecutor of Hoffa, was there, we were born on the same day and we shared a room together

over there, so we had a good time. But it was a good firm. But then along came the civil rights
days, and Harris [Wofford] had gone with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. And he was
working with Father [Theodore M.] Hesberg, as a legal assistant, and asked me whether or not I
would be interested in, (this was after two or three years) be interested in heading up the voting
section, doing the investigation on ‘deprivation of the right to vote’. And since I'd been involved
in some civil rights stuff at Dartmouth, I was eager and left the firm. I took a leave of absence
and never returned actually. But that little leave of absence lasted over four years, and it was
worth, worth it all, so. I don't know, where do we go from here? I could go in a lot of details,
but you don't want to hear all that.
DN:

Just a couple of questions. One is, the Verner Liipfert firm had not been formed then?

BB: No, no, we were attorney and attorney. And then 1960 came about and I took leave from
the civil rights commission to work on the Kennedy campaign for the summer. And when that
concluded, I did not, I didn't expect that I would be nominated to be staff director of the civil
rights commission, and so I was planning to go back. And before I was nominated, Jim Verner
and I started the firm called Verner and Bernhard. And then about two months after we started
the firm, I got a call from the White House about, the president was interested in nominating me.
Would I be interested in doing that? And I really thought about it a lot. And Jim said, “You got
to do it.” The president, I saw the president and he asked me if I would do it, and I was only
twenty-eight or twenty-nine, and I thought this is really good stuff. Little did I know what I was
getting into or, the confirmation process which was just agonizing. And you remember what the
civil rights conditions were in 1960 and '61, it was bitter.
I'll tell you one funny thing, after I'd been nominated, it just occurs to me, I went up to see all the
members of the judiciary committee. Ted Sorenson said, “You better do that, because it's going
to be a controversial appointment and so you'd better go see . . . .” I went to see everybody, and
I was pretty well turned down by most of them. And I went to see Olin [DeWitt Talmadge]
Johnston, who was then from South Carolina, and not an indecent fellow. But I figured, what the
heck, I have to go see him anyway, so I did. And I came in there, I walked into his office and he
looked me up one side and the other. And he said, “Well, damn, I'm glad to see you. I didn't
know if you were going to be black or white.” [laughter] And that started it.
And then we started talking about, he told me, he said, “I don't have a problem with you but you
know I can't vote for you. I mean, it's impossible, I just can't afford to do that.” But he said,
“You know what's going on right now?” I said, “No, I don't senator.” And he said, “Well come
on down to the floor, I want you to listen to it, there's a debate on civil rights going on right
now.” So we went down and we sat in the well, stood in the well of the Senate listening to this
debate.
And Strom Thurmond was at, in those days, was not what he found necessary to be later,
because of the voting opportunities of the blacks. And he was inveighing against all these
northern Communist coming down and causing all these problems, and started using the word
'nigger' on the floor. And I thought, “Oh man.” And suddenly I looked up and Olin Johnston
leaned over me, he said, “You hear that?” And I said, “Yes.” And he said, “Well, you know
what the problem with old Strom is?” And I didn't want to say, I was just stunned by his

comments. He said, “You know what the problem is? The problem is old Strom believes that
shit.” [laughter] So I learned a lot during that whole confirmation process. It took seven months
to get confirmed, and a lot of other things had happened. But it was, it worked, it was all right
and it was a great experience.
DN:

What triggered your interest in civil rights originally?

BB: I guess I always had kind of an interest, but what really brought it to a head was at
Dartmouth. I played football for a year and a half, until I banged up a knee and had an operation.
There was a fellow that was playing on the football team, a halfback, good guy that was black,
and he was pledged to the DEK [Delta Kappa Epsilon] fraternity. And after he'd been pledged,
the DEK fraternity was told by its national [chapter] that they could not accept him as a member
of the fraternity. Well, I was kind of outraged by it, and I was vocal about it. And later I was
elected president of the student government and I thought, well, I got to do something about this.
So I was able to pass a student referendum which said that any fraternity which had nationals
which discriminated on the base of race, religion, national origin, could not continue to
participate in any of the programs or inter-fraternity competitions at Dartmouth. And if they
persisted in that, they would have to go local. And if they didn't go local they could not exist on
campus after a transitional period of four or five years. That was an over-reach, because we
didn't own the fraternities and we probably couldn't have done anything to them to make them
leave the campus, but we could exclude them and that's what happened. And it worked pretty
well, but that's how, that is really, it got started.
Remember Frenzel, Bill Frenzel? See, I had gone into a fraternity and it was really, it turned out
that our fraternity, which was Sigma Nu had a national clause in it. So I ended up my senior
year putting Sigma Nu plus seven others on probation, and it was rather embarrassing. And
Frenzel was president of the fraternity at the time, I was not very popular, I didn't go to the
fraternities my last year in school. But anyway, that's what got started, and it was a difficult time
I have to tell you one little anecdote about it, was that I didn't quite know how to proceed with it,
because it was so controversial in those days about, you know, how do you handle overt
discriminatory actions. And I went to see a fellow named Robert Carr, Bob Carr who was
chairman of the government department. He later became president of Oberlin. He was the
fellow that I ended up writing my thesis for. And he had been head of Truman's committee on
civil rights which desegregated the armed services. And he was my advisor about how to go
about this, and not be a hothead and do something really stupid. And he told me I had to really
work through with the trustees, because there are twelve trustees, and they have a lot of power
and they could prevent this if they really wanted to.
So we worked out a very careful plan with the president of the student council, Dickey, who was
quite favorable. And I ended up making a presentation to the board, and I was very nervous
about it, to put it mildly. And fortunately that day Nelson Rockefeller, who was an active
graduate, was making a presentation to the board and he sat through it. And at the end of it there
was silence for a second and I thought, “Well, this is over.” And suddenly he jumped up,
grabbed my hand and said, “Listen fellow, it's about time someone did something like this at
Dartmouth College. And I'm telling you we're going to support you one hundred percent, don't

you worry about it.” Well, from then on Nelson and I, well they did sup-, they didn't do
anything but they didn't cause any problems, and Nelson and I became big friends after that. In
fact, I had a drink with him that night to thank him for it. So, it was an interesting time, but that's
what had really pricked my interest initially.
DN:

And you continued and served on the civil rights commission (unintelligible word)?

BB: Until two weeks before the president's assassination. And then I went back into the firm
and subsequent thereto, about two years later, Johnson asked me to serve as a director with
[Rev.] Walter Fauntroy and counsel to the White House conference to fulfill these rights. And if
you remember, in the interim period, President Kennedy, before maybe the fall of '63, summer,
late summer, and Lyndon Johnson and Bob Kennedy established the lawyer's committee for civil
rights under law, and I was director of that from the law firm when I came back in. In a lot of
time we established offices in Jackson, Mississippi and a number of other places. So I continued
that, but I finally had to, you know, try to make a living. Those things weren't going to do it.
DN:

So you were doing some volunteer work between '63 and '68?

BB: Right. Yeah, but then along came Fred Dutton who was then, had been secretary of the
Cabinet under Kennedy, and asked me to help with the issue of discrimination in the State
Department and the boycott of South Africa. And so I went over and worked a little bit with
Averell Harriman before he departed, and that was an interesting experience. Again, it was not
what I would call a paying job, but it was fun. And so, but then I went back and I really did
focus on our law practice for a while. I was teaching for two years as an adjunct professor at
Georgetown, at the law school, on current problems of Constitutional law, which was fun. I had
some interesting students, like John McEvoy and Harold Pachios and some people like that, so it
was kind of fun.
DN:

The lines that go on.

BB:

Yeah, it just continues, but it's kind of fun.

DN:

When did you get involved with Ed Muskie?

BB: After an interesting experience. Well first, let me tell you, I got to know Joe Tydings
when he was U.S. attorney and I was with the commission. And then when he ran in '64 for
senator, he asked me to chair the, of course we'd become friends, we tried desegregating
(unintelligible phrase) if you remember, he was really helpful on that. But anyway, we became
friends, he asked me to chair the Montgomery county campaign and be coordinator for a few of
the other counties, in his campaign.
So the reason that is relevant is that after, I guess I can't remember the exact year, '65 maybe,
when. . . . I was the first general counsel of the Democratic senate campaign, and Ed became
chairman of that, if you recall. I can't remember the year, but he became chairman because of
the fallout from the Tom Dodd problem. And it turned out that the people who were involved in
the file theft, we don't talk about this too much, but one of them turns out to have been my

secretary at the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and had worked for Tom
Dodd. And her boyfriend, Jim Boyd, had been his administrative assistant. You may have
known Jim Boyd. [Don Nicoll gestures in the affirmative] Well, I represented them in the
controversies on the Hill and with the FBI and a number of other things.
In any event, right after that it became relevant only because that started the Democratic senate
campaign committee's desire to clean up. And Ed, who was always Mr. Clean, was asked to
chair it. And Joe Tydings had been asked to be the vice chairman, and he had recommended me
to Senator Muskie. And I didn't know Senator Muskie other than by reputation until then, at all,
and we had a reasonably long chat, for about an hour. And as you know when you first got to
meet Senator Muskie when he didn't know you, I think he had a huge quantity of reservation.
And he asked me a lot of questions and ended up saying, “I think you'll do, but I think you better
talk to the other members of the committee.” And so I made my rounds. I knew Tyd was okay.
The one person that was really blunt, and actually turned out to be very helpful, was Scoop
Jackson. I went to see him because Senator Muskie had set it up. And he gave me his views and
he said, “I don't have any problems, any problems at all with your cleaning up some of our
obviously questionable activities. But if we're going to have some nitpicking lawyer coming in
here and second guessing every political decision we make on some legal grounds, it won't work
and I will oppose that. So I don't mind you being very precise, but I do mind you being a
nitpicker, and I'm going to oversee that.” And he was very good actually. We became good
friends.
Well, I went back and saw Ed, and that was the first time, when I went back to see him after it
was understood that I'd be acceptable. And it was the first time I really saw something in him
that I began to appreciate much more as it went. Because I went back and I said, “It looks like
everything's okay.” And he said, “Yes it is and we ought to get started.” He pointed out first,
one: please understand this is not a paying position; two: we have to set up certain criteria for
how we're going to handle receipt of money, and we're going to have to get away from the cash
accounting here. And I said, “I'll try to do what I can.”
And then he stopped, and I remember it very clearly because he, the way he would lean down
with the intent gaze, and he said to me, “I know there'll be continuing opposition to making this
too constrictive, so that we won't be able to operate. I don't think that's the case. I think we can
do it.” I remember this so clearly, “We can do it cleanly and that's what I expect.” And he said,
“Let me put it this way: if you are satisfied that there is a right way to do it, that's what I expect
you to recommend. Now, I'm not always going to accept what you recommend, but I want you
to be able to justify it, on the basis that you believe this is warranted and required as a matter of
law. And then we can talk about how we deal with that later. I don't expect you to come in and
tell us how we deal with the legal parameters of it. I expect to get you to make recommendations
based on the law. We'll determine how it's going to be done, and it'll be done right.” And I
thought, whoa, this is not what I expected, but this is great. And I think that started our
relationship.
And I have a feeling that coming in from the outside was desirable because I didn't have any
particular baggage. I'd never worked for him. And I think it was helpful because I didn't feel

encumbered and I later realized how important that was because he was such a dominating
personality that, you know. I have a feeling if I'd been with him for too long it would have
generated the kind of submersion that I could see he was capable of. And I think it ended up
where we could have pretty good arguments and he knew I could walk away, and it worked kind
of. And I felt very comfortable arguing with him or disagreeing with him. But I must say I have
met a lot of people but there was no one more formidable than Senator Muskie in argument, both
in substance, in articulation, and being totally irate about your disagreement.
One of the things that I remember which was, it just so stuck in my head. There was one time
we were having an argument about something and there was suddenly silence for a minute. And
Ed looked up at me and he said, “You know what your problem is?” And I said, “I'm not sure.”
“You think we're having a conversation.” And it kind of summarized the whole relationship.
But it's, that’s what started it all, and I guess I kept doing that even after he stepped down and
Senator Inouye became chair of the committee. But I kept up the relationship with Ed and, you
know, just with great respect. I mean, you have to adore him and fear him, and feel
uncomfortable all at the same time.
DN:

Now, you got involved in the '68 campaign.

BB: Yeah, that was because of the senate campaign committee. We were out there as counsel
of the committee and we were at the hotel with all that god awful mess and the smell of gas and
the police and the broken glass. It was just a horror show.
And then, I guess there had been speculation about Ed becoming the vice presidential candidate.
You never know, and I certainly didn't know. And then there was a knock on the door and there
was Hubert. This was about, I think, around four o'clock in an afternoon, and they had a chat.
And then Ed said, “Well what am I going to say?” after Hubert had left. And Leon was there,
and the two of us were trying to figure out what he was going to say. And I don't know if you
remember his performance there, but he had a combination of papers, and I wasn't sure, either he
knew they pieced together or whether he could read them. But he had, he went up to the
podium, he had, as I found out later was standard that this is, as he told me three or four times,
“I'm not going to give this speech you wrote, it's got a broken back.”
And we had pieced together all kinds of prior statements or speeches, transitional clauses and
phrases and things like that. And no matter how we did it, Ed found something wrong with it
and we never had the time to retype it because he was speaking at seven or seven-thirty that
night. And, you know, he finally with great annoyance took this all together and put in more
effective transitional statements and the right conclusion, and you know, you realized how good
he was, how smart he was. But it was just, we, I just held my breath when he was giving it
because I figured one page goes out of here and we're dead because it was not nice and clean, it
was not typed well. It was cross outs, Muskie writings, papers that were not even put together
well, it was kind of, but it worked.
So then he asked me to come with him, and then, during the campaign and to help coordinate
with Hubert's campaign, which I did. That was enough chaos as I've ever seen. It was an
interesting campaign. And you know, Ed stood out in that campaign.

DN: What was the arrangement from your perspective during that campaign between the two
candidates and the two campaign staffs?
BB: Well, it was never clear. First of all, Hubert had, I don't remember all their names, Bill
Wel- DN:

Bill Welch.

BB: Bill Welch, and then there was a guy who was running the campaign, who got into trouble
later.
DN:

I forget the name of that person.

BB: Yeah, I’ll have to get that to you. But there was a hierarchy in the Humphrey campaign,
but it was never very clear. It seemed to gyrate and became, to me, a kind of a happening. There
was no one that had clearly defined schedule responsibilities, that changed rather frequently.
And Hubert was on the phone almost every day with Ed talking about how things were going,
what needed to be done. And I can remember one time when we were flying to Seattle and we
were to meet, in mid-flight Hubert said, cancel Seattle and go to San Antonio, and I thought,
Jesus, we're not ready for that, why are we doing this. But that was the way the campaign was.
And from Ed's standpoint, he was never very precise about how that campaign should be run,
from an administrative standpoint. And Don [sic Dick] Dubord DN:

Dick Dubord.

BB: Dick Dubord, was a very close friend, and I think a very decent and smart guy. And I
think Ed relied on his judgments a lot, even though I don't think he was, had the breadth of
national politics. I'm not sure any of us did, outside of Ed. But it, George participated to some
extent. Ed made very clear he wanted the Senate staff to do his Senate work while he was
campaigning, and I'm not sure that was very helpful because the coordination with the Senate
staff became more difficult because, you know, he would change, maybe because of Humphrey,
maybe because of Muskie, they would change speeches in mid-course, they would change
places, geography of where we were, and it was very difficult to coordinate what was happening
outside and what was happening on the Senate staff. And he was always very, he wanted to
draw what I always believed was an artificial line, there was no question about that. And, you
know, George was involved in the campaign, and Dick Dubord and some other people. But it
was not a clear, there were never clear lines. Ed didn't like clear lines.
And the other problem, and it came to a head in Cleveland, to be quite honest about it. There
was a, as you maybe recall, it was a really difficult period because of 1968, you know, Dr. King
and Bob Kennedy and there was a very much anti-Humphrey wing of the party, not just in the
party but nationally. And I thought that we really had to make an effort to enlist as many of the
dissident Kennedy people as possible. And there was a big rally, anti-Humphrey rally, at the
hotel where we were staying in Cleveland. And I wanted Ed to come down and talk to them
because I thought he could make a difference. And I went up to his room to say I really, I want

to encourage you, please, to come down. There's some people we could use in the campaign,
they're ground forces we need. I don't think it's impossible to woo them over, you're not stuck in
the mud on Vietnam. I know you can't walk away from it altogether, but.
Well, we got into this argument which extended, I went, well Ed turned it down, and I went
down to try to talk to them. It was not effective. And I came back up to say that I thought this
was symbolic of the problems I perceived in our campaign, that we weren't reaching out far
enough, that we were going to the center of the party and that the left of the party was
antithetical and would not support us, and we needed them to win. Well, we got, I went back up
and it got to be, it was the first real screamer that I had with Ed. And he was tired, he was
irascible, from my standpoint, and it got very loud to the point that Jane, who was trying to sleep
in a closed bedroom, came out and said, “What is wrong?” And he turned around and told her
basically to get back in the room.
And it continued, with Dick Dubord trying to be the peacemaker between me and Ed. It was a, I
was, I regretted it, but yet I felt very strongly about it. The upshot was that I said to him, I
thought I was the wrong person to be working with him because I disagreed with the strategy of
the campaign. And I said, “If you don't mind, I'd like to leave.” And so the next morning I
packed up and left, and went back to Washington. I had a, picture of Ed underneath the door,
and signed (unintelligible phrase) Berl. I don't know where it is, I'll have to find it. But Ed
wrote, “I appreciate all you're doing, and I look forward to seeing you back in Washington,” and
signed it and left it under the door. And I went back, you know, and I said, “Well I just, this is
not, I'm just not fit for this and this is not, we're not a good mix.”
And about three or four days later I guess, he got back in Washington. He called me and said,
“Are you still pouting?” And I said, “I'm not pouting. I wasn't pouting before, but I think you
need people that are more in concert with your approach to this, and obviously I'm not one of
them.” And he said, “That's not true!” And then I heard a, “You come up here, I want to talk
to you.” So we went up and we had a discussion about it. And he said I misconstrued what his
position was, and “come back and help.” And, you know, I admired him. And I said, “Fine,” so
I went back. And the campaign went pretty well actually.
I found something that was impossible to do, and that was to write an acceptable speech for him.
There was no speech except one, I think, that I worked on, that was given in Seattle, that he ever
found moderately acceptable. And he would call everybody he knew to write a speech. I know
he would call Don Nicoll in the Senate; he would call Dick Goodwin in Maine; he would call
Bob Shrum. He would call anybody except the people who were close to him, that were in the
campaign. That was, at the time it was George and me basically, and Carole [Parmelee?] and
Gayle [Cory] and some people. But it was not what you would call a large traveling staff, and he
did not have speech writers with him. But there was no speech that was ever given, I can tell
you, I mean it, it was difficult.
And then Humphrey's people would continue to send over material which he thought he was
under a mandate to use. I didn't think much of some of it, even though it was from a,
wordsmanship was quite good. It was defensive. And I thought that we were going to get into
trouble with it. So we used to have arguments about what we had to do as far as cooperation

with the Humphrey camp. And I must say, Ed did not have a problem dealing with Hubert, I
didn't think. I think he was straight. But he did believe that, as a matter of loyalty to him, that
when it came down to the ultimate fight over an issue, he had a tendency, which I can't say was
wrong, but I didn't always agree with it, to defer to Hubert, which was appropriate since Hubert
was the candidate.
But I think, sometimes I look back and I wonder, we lost by a quarter percent. And I always
have thought back and wondered if either we'd really made more of an effort with the Kennedy
wing, McGovern group, which was still active, as you know. And the Kennedy family was very
supportive of George McGovern, even though he wasn't the candidate. And I don't know, I just
always wondered if we'd just been able to enlist them. But I guess if you enlisted them you lost
some moderates at the same time, so it may have balanced out, but I always wondered about that.
And whether or not we would have won if Humphrey could have extracted himself some from
the Johnson-Vietnam mistake, and Ed feeling that he could say a few things that were much
more to the, moving toward peace side. And he did, he did separate himself from Hubert, but it
wasn't dramatic. It was trying to convince Hubert to step away, and there are a whole series of
things that, if you remember, there was a change in Hubert's position as it moved, which
antagonized the Johnson people. It was a difficult time. But I think that, of course with the
Williamsport speech and things like that, he acquitted himself brilliantly.
He was a loyal citizen, and he was a hell of a good campaigner. He showed the signs, though,
that he had, that he showed later on in '71 and '2, that tiredness, energy level. He didn't have
Hubert's energy, or Bob Kennedy's energy. And as his energy would wane, his disposition
would be adversely affected, shall we say. And that became much more of a problem later when
he really had the ultimate responsibility. But there were signs of it in '68 as well, which is no
one's fault but that was a fact, I think. And I saw it a number of times during the campaign.
DN: Talk a little bit about the question of energy. You have referred to his formidable
personality and the way he would argue. At the same time you talk about his energy not being
the same as Hubert or Lyndon Johnson for that matter, or Robert Kennedy. Was it tied in with,
was it a general physiological fact, or was it related to what motivated him?
BB: Well, I think, that's a good question because I have never been sure of that. I believe, for
example, that in '71 and '2, he did not have the same level of hunger for the presidency that John
Kennedy had had, Bob Kennedy had. I always thought, and I still do, that Ed was a person of
very considerable, very considerable intellectual capability and a very large brain. And I think
with, with a unique perspective about what the country required, and that, whether it had to do
with the environment or the budget or whatever, didn't make any difference. That, these things
really End of Side A
Side B
DN:

. . . of the interview with Berl Bernhard, April 30th, 2002. Go ahead, Berl.

BB: Well, we were talking about Ed's energy level and what it was, and his motivation. I
really think, and I'll be more specific about it, that he in his heart believed that if you articulated
a vision of where the country should be going on some of the most fundamental issues . . . . I
think about his endless and enormous contribution in the environmental area, Clean Water,
Clean Air, whatever it was, (sounds like: café unintelligible word) standards on cars, everything.
And on his concern about fiscal responsibility. I think he believed that if you stood for certain
things that were important for the country, that would be not enough, but a grand contribution to
being almost enough, to run the country.
I think the strictly political aspects, and I mean political in the sense of the details of a campaign,
were never comfortable for him, as comfortable as the issues. I really believe that. The details
of a campaign, the discipline of trying to work out schedules, which he always talked about, as
we're all aware, there are no white spaces. I found it was an annoyance to him to be confronted,
as was unfortunately mandated in trying to run something for him, to get the discipline of a
political life.
And I, so when you say, what was his motivation? I think his motivation was for a better
country in the real sense of it, the substantive sense of what the country needed. But in terms of
the motivation to do all of the nasty, detailed, political campaigning was not comfortable for
him. I never felt he was really comfortable with it, despite the fact that he had the political
instincts to respond to issues as they came up, as he did in Williamsport [PA]. You know, the
instinct to have people come up and to listen to what people were saying. And I think it was a
genuine listening, it wasn't phony listening. He wanted to know because, again, it went back to
what I think at the core was his substantive interest in major issues and how they unfolded, how
they could, what their meaning would be for the American people, individually. But the details
of it were confounding to him, and annoying to him, and it undermined the motivation to become
president or vice president. And it certainly showed itself much more in '71 and '2 than it did in
'68 when he really had the responsibility.
I can tell you, the one, you know, I really kind of loved him for it and I hated him for it at the
same time. The night before the Florida primary we were at the Dupont Plaza Hotel, and I had
asked all of our field people to please meet me in the lobby before, that night, so we could give
out final instructions and directions for what they had to do to get out the vote, and to see that
people got to the polls. And I had them all there, and it was probably ten-thirty at night, and I
look up and who do I see come into the lobby, Hubert in person. And he saw me there and came
over, and we had a big chat, and he said, “Where's Ed?” And I said, “Well, he's upstairs, he's
just finished up.” He'd been up there for a few hours and I was trying to get him to come down.
But then when Hubert Humphrey was there, I thought ‘what an opportunity’, let's get . . . .
So I went up to Ed's room and said to him, “I need to talk to you, Senator. It's really important
because Humphrey's down in the lobby, we've got maybe a hundred of our key people down
there and we're trying to give out last minute instructions for tomorrow morning. And I think it
would be really a great thing for you to come down and rally the forces, and say, ‘Hello’ to
Hubert to show, you know, everything's all right.” And he was in bed reading, and he said, “Do
you know what I'm doing?” I said, “Yes, you're in bed reading.” And he said, “Do you know
what I'm reading?” And he told me, it was some Victorian historical novel, and, it was

(unintelligible phrase) of the Eighteenth or some damn thing, I can't remember, I'll have to
remember what. And I said, “Well I'm really not interested in that, but it's really important to get
you down there.” Silence. And he said, “Let me read to you. You want to hear some beautiful
prose?” And I said, “Not particularly.” He said, “Listen to this.” So he read it. And I said, I
looked at my watch and said, “It's 10:40.” At which he said, “And it's time for you to leave.”
That concluded my opportunity to get him down into the lobby, but it said it all. I mean he was
clearly enjoying reading. He was clearly enjoying the syntax, the verbiage, the thought of this
book. And I realized, my God, here is Hubert running around, this hyper-energy and hyper kinetic like a fourteen year old. And there's Ed, intellectually reading this book which he is
totally enjoying, immersed in. And I'm saying to myself, this campaign is really screwed.
But it wasn't, you know. We lost in Florida but, as you know Wallace won, and hell, we all got
polished on that. And then we came back and won in Illinois big, big on that. That's what I felt,
I mean I felt that he, it wasn't a motivation, lack of motivation, to want to be president, it was a
discomfort about all of the miniscule, dreadful demands on his life, his psyche, everything. It
wasn't him. That's why he'd be so good in debate, because he was so damned smart and knew
the issues so well. But when it came to the minutia of scheduling, which was always a trauma.
DN: As I hear you talking about this, it impresses me that, from your point of view, he
resented and did not want to get involved in the minutia of campaigning, but if you look at his
performance on legislation BB:

Totally different.

DN: . . . . he would absorb himself in the minutia . . . .
BB:

Loved it.

DN:

. . . . of both the substantive arguments . . . .

BB:

Tactics.

DN:

. . . . the tactics, the reactions of other people.

BB: See, but that was, I used to think about that all the time because that was a definable goal,
something that he knew was needed. It was circumscribed, it was targeted. He knew where he
wanted it come out and he was prepared to do whatever was necessary, including all the political
machinations and cooperative efforts that were required. And the management of legislation on
the floor and handling of amendments, that was all for a goal that he had set in his mind as
important for America. And I really believe that.
It was much more tenuous when you got into the whole thing of governing the country, or
politicking throughout the country. There was no, there wasn't time to direct your entire being to
recognize that miniscule details could unhorse a campaign. The goal was much more uncertain,
except in the biggest picture. I think if there were ten issues that govern a campaign, Ed would
win handily because he would know how to accomplish each one of those definable goals. But it

was much more uncertain, much more inchoate, much more broad. And he didn't see the
connection sometimes, between the extraordinary demands on his mind for managing details or
responding affirmatively to details of something that wasn't clearly moving toward a, an
acceptable or desired ultimate goal. And I really, it was an annoyance to him, and it showed.
I mean, it's no secret that Ed and I had many arguments, had many, some quiet and some loud.
But, you know, it wasn't lack of respect on my part. It was the feeling that I had all along, that
there was a huge gap between his level of comfort in accomplishing definable goals and as a
campaigner, as a national politician. I mean, no one was better on the talk shows, no one could
deliver a speech better, unless you didn't have a speech that he decided, you had written, and it
was to be discarded, at which time he could speak endlessly to the point you'd want to say,
enough, enough, enough. But he had a lot to say. And, there was just a significant difference. I
never had the opportunity to see what everybody that was close to him in the Senate saw, and
that was a really great mind and a great legislator, and someone who knew how to get things
done in the context of the Senate. In legislation, he understood all that, but when you put
legislation aside and you talk everything from prison riots to (unintelligible word), it was not
comfortable for him to just respond to that. There wasn't time to study; that was what I think
drove him more into, I don't know, exhaustion, depression at times, that he was being asked to
respond to myriad, sometimes miniscule, sometimes important, public issues which he hadn't
studied. I mean, he wanted to know more than any of us could ever have taught him,
instantaneously, and that's how the campaign, that's how a campaign is. And it, his discomfort at
dealing with some of these issues that just flowed, was manifest.
DN: Let's shift from, we've jumped back and forth between '68 and the '71-'72 campaign. Let's
go between those two to that 1969 period when BB:

Everybody said he should be president.

DN: Right. And you were advising him during that period. What was your sense of his mood
and his response?
BB: I believe in '69, leading up to the '70 speech in Maine, that he really had decided that he,
he could lead the country, that there was a strong enough following for him to attain that
possibility, that there were a number of things that he could say or articulate better than anyone
else. And I really think it was in his gut to want to be president. It was, at the same time,
reasonably clear to me that the issues were going to be difficult with him when it came to raw
politics. That I don't think he perceived the huge difference between organizing state by state,
and organizing in Maine, for a successful campaign and establishing the hegemony of the
Democratic party in Maine.
He, a number of things happened, I mean we had talked a good deal certainly early in 1970 about
what was needed. And I know I had done a number of memos to him about what would be
needed, from the standpoint of raising money, which was crucial; from the standpoint of
organizational effort state by state; the fact that he would have to step aside, for all intents and
purposes, as a legislator and find some people in whom he would have confidence, his
colleagues in the Senate who could take some of the responsibilities; that he would have to miss

a number of key votes, which would be an enormous problem for him because he was so proud
of his voting record. And there were all these kinds of things that were impinging on how he felt
about it.
But I do believe that when it came to the election eve speech back-to-back with Nixon, in which
I think we all got pounded from him. And Dick Goodwin came in as the good white knight and
drove us all totally crazy, but the result was good. And Bob Squier did a wonderful job on
orchestrating it and etcetera. It was, in an odd way looking back on it, it was both a wonderful
and a disastrous event because it thrust him immediately into being the likely heir to the
nomination for president of the country, and we were ill prepared for it.
You know, I'm sure you can recall, we all recall the problems of inability to respond to all the
letters that came in, and the volunteers that wanted to help. We had no organization to be, I
guess, moving on the offense and being able to mobilize people, to galvanize their, their interest
in him. And I think we ran off all kinds of people who would otherwise have made ongoing
commitments to him, because we didn't respond well. We didn't have a good database. I mean it
was something that I feel, looking back, I was very naive and very ingenuous about our ability to
do all those things, and to move him to really secure the nomination, well in advance of the
convention. I don't think I appreciated the gap between the public persona of Ed Muskie and the
need for the structure to make it possible for him to succeed.
We had a few people who were helping us financially. We didn't have a real finance committee
early on. We didn't have money. We didn't have state people identified. We weren't responding
well to people who wanted to help. And, you know, it may have been that if we had had, say,
more experience I guess in, rapid organization, and rapid fund raising, and the ability to have
recognized that we had to slow down the process, to catch up with the process structurally, we
would have been better off. But it was, you know, looking back is one thing, being there at the
time was very different. And we did everything we could to try to both move him ahead, and in
a rather disorganized manner began to put a campaign together. So that evening was, as I said,
both wonderful and disastrous, and we never caught up in a sense.
DN: Do you recall his mood prior to Chappaquiddick and the Teddy Kennedy phenomenon, or
is that not part of the picture for you right now?
BB: Well, I don't know how to begin on that. You would probably recall later on in the
campaign when we had the dirty tricks, and Ted Kennedy, it was like we were attacking Ted
Kennedy? And we had the Chappaquiddick thing brought up again. I, you know, it was funny, I
always had the feeling that there was a, an undercurrent, maybe it was more than that, in Ed’s
mind, you know. It was like the parable of the talents. Remember in the Bible, "To he who has
it shall be given, he shall have it in abundance, and to he who shall not even have it, to he it shall
be taken away" [Luke 19:26]. Well, I always had the feeling there was some of that with Ed and
Ted Kennedy. And there was a, I think before Chappaquiddick Ed, I don't know if this is true, I
always had the feeling that he might not have had the motivation to really move out from the
Kennedys. But after that I think he felt a little different about it. I don't know how to, really, but
I know there were a number of times that I insisted that Ed call Ted Kennedy during the
campaign because there was unhappiness all around, on that. Well, we had the same problem, as

you know, in Florida with Hubert and Scoop Jackson on some of the dirty tricks. But I don't
remember all the details of the Kennedy thing, I'd have to go back and look at it. I know there
was a concern on my part, both as to Ed's view of Ted Kennedy before and then after. It was a
defining moment in a sense, Chappaquiddick, for Ed.
DN: They, what I was recalling and I wondered whether you had as well, was the fact that Ed
felt that no matter what he did in the 1969 period, he never could get attention the way Ted
Kennedy could. And it led to the kind of frustration that you were describing.
BB: I swear, it was a parable of the talents, I always thought that he thought that the Kennedys
had just gotten it all, it had been given to them. And there was that certain level of resentment,
you know, it was there. I mean, it was a resentment that no matter what Ed did, it was of little
public consequence. No matter what Ted Kennedy did, good or bad, it was headlines. And it
was the whole Kennedy family, I mean that's how he saw it. It's understandable.
DN: Let's come back to the '70 to '72 campaign, and you were talking about a limited number
of financial backers. One of the people, little known today, the late Arnold Picker who was very
active, and I'd like to get your recollections of Arnold, how he came into the campaign, what
kind of a person he was.
BB: Well, Arnold Picker was everything that you would have expected, to admire Ed Muskie.
Arnold Picker could well have been the most decent wealthy man in the United States. As you
know, he'd been vice chair of United Artists, Bob Benjamin I guess was the chairman of it. I've
never been sure quite where Ed and Arnold Picker met, but I met Arnold very early on and, in
the campaign. And I very clearly remember the first meeting that Arnold and Ed and I had about
the campaign, when Ed said, what did I think about Arnold chairing his finance committee. And
I said, “Well, if we could get him to do it.” We had a meeting up in, I guess it was in the little
hall DN:

The hideaway.

BB: Cave, yeah, the hideaway, the cave I used to call it. And I remember Ed talking to him
and asking would he do this and how important it would be. And Arnold said he would do it
enthusiastically, I really, “I'd rather do this than anything than I can think of. You must be
president of the United States. We all need this.” And he said, “And I want to make something
clear to you.” And Ed kind of, “What is that?” He said, I, “There is nothing that I want or
nothing that I would take in the government. I want to be clear, if I do this I'm doing this as an
American citizen, I am not doing it for any personal gain, and I am not doing it for a job of any
kind. And if we have that understanding, and you will be open with me and I can be open with
you . . . . “ And it turned out that Arnold was more than open with Ed, he was very direct with
him the whole way. He accepted. And from then on I would say we never had a more loyal,
more decent, more committed individual than Arnold Picker. I mean, he was really the salt of
the earth, there was no one, I never met anybody that I liked more, admired more, or did more.
Just a good person all around. He was wonderful.
And then when we assembled the finance committee, and I would prefer not to comment on

some of the members of it because I didn't like some of them, and I didn't think that they cared
much about Ed, they cared about themselves, and it was not pleasant with some of them. But we
never mounted the kind of the finance effort, and it goes back to what I said earlier, it was not
just a detail, it was combat with Ed to get him to allow us to schedule fund raisers. He didn't like
them. We had some very unpleasant ones, including one in Texas which turned out to be like
raising money, bonds for Israel, because it was at someone's house outside of Houston.
Everybody was asked to stand up and announce a pledge, and I think everyone, Arnold was
uncomfortable, I almost died. And I think Ed handled it very well, but he was so embarrassed
about it. I mean, he couldn't believe that he was in the middle of something like this. But that
was a serious problem, I mean it was a combination of difficulty in other areas as well
politically, schedule, and of a total dislike for the whole problem of fund raising.
But, you know, the other thing that came out during the campaign that, you know, just reinforced
why it was we all loved the man so much and respected him so much. We'd go to these little
fund raisers which were just dreadful, I mean it couldn't have been worse. And people would
shove money into his hands, you know, small people, people without real resources but they
really believed in him. And we'd go back to a hotel room and Ed would empty his pockets,
there'd be all kinds of change and dollar bills and everything. And he'd reach in his pocket, I'd
be standing there, and he'd put them on the top of a bureau and say, “Oh, these people gave me
all this money, it's not mine, it's for the campaign.” And I said, “Did you get all their names?”
And he'd say, “I don't even know who they were.” But it was, he'd do this fairly regularly. It
wasn't like, for show, it was that he had that honor in him that it never occurred to him that he
would be doing other than taking any monies, no matter how big or small, that was for the
campaign, it was never personal, it was not for him, it was for the campaign. And it was, I just
got used to that after a while, that was his behavior. Someone gave him a hundred dollar bill, it
would be on the bureau. And it was the same whenever we had these little things, and it just, it
was just his sense of private integrity, and it was there, and that's what, you know, so.
But that was a very difficult time. The fund raising efforts were not good. I really would prefer
not to talk about specific individuals, but there were people who in, on the fund raising side, I
think took advantage of Ed and would ask him to do things which shouldn't have happened. I
can think of Los Angeles and Denver as just dreadful examples of it. I guess I can mention one,
but we'll put some restriction on it.
DN: Certainly.
BB: Okay, Mort Tapley had a very close friend named Marvin Davis who was a big oil, Davis
Oil, in Denver. And so Mort called me one day and said, “You know, we can raise a lot of
money in Denver if we can get Ed out there.” And I said, “Okay, but I want to talk to Mr. Davis
first to be sure we have an understanding.” “Fine.” So I talked to Marvin Davis, I didn't know
him, and I told him what we expected and how much money we hoped we'd raise. And we were
talking about big bucks in those days, like a hundred thousand dollars, which was just beyond
the pale. So it was all arranged. We flew there, and we got to this huge house outside of
Denver. And I had met him that morning so we had, I reiterated what my expectations were.
We got there, the place was jammed. And I expected Mr. Davis to stand up, because he said he

wanted to be part of our finance committee, to announce his intention to support Ed, to raise all
this money. Not a word. And there were all these people there. And at the end of the evening I
went over to Mr. Davis and I said, “How did we do? Did you get these pledges? Did you collect
the money?” He said, “Well, we didn't do very well.” I said, “Well what are all these people
doing here?” “It's my anniversary. And I thought that having Ed Muskie here would be, they
would really appreciate that.” And I said, “Mr. Davis, do you know you're toying with the man
who should be president of the United States? You're using him for your anniversary. I am
absolutely livid about this, and I'd like to talk to your father,” who was there, and I went, I think
he, subsequently I think he's died. And I said, “Mr. Davis, we have been, I think, sorely treated,
and I am very upset, and I want to know what you're going to do. “Well, I'll meet you in the
morning.” I said, “Fine.”
So I went downtown and saw him in the morning. And they had raised, with Davis' contribution,
something like ten, twelve thousand dollars. It was unbelievable. And I was out of control. And
I told him I expected him to make up the difference one way or the other and (unintelligible
phrase). We never got much more money out of him. And (unintelligible phrase), well I won't
mention the name, but we were going back in the car from downtown Denver to the airport, and
I was furious. And the fellow who had really set up the schedule, he'd had no responsibility, I
did, for the fiasco. But we're coming back and I said, this is the worst mistreatment of a
candidate and a person that I have ever seen in this entire campaign. I've seen a lot of raw stuff,
but this is the worst. Silence for a second. “Oh,” he said, “no, it's not the worst.” I said, “It is
the worst. What are you talking about?” He said, “Oh things could be a lot worse, I mean, I got
laid last night.” And I said, “And so?” “With his daughter!” That’s a wrap.
In any event that was, and there were things like that, you know, where people were using the
senator. And I was not chagrined, that would be an unfair word, but Ed did not want to confront
any of it, he thought this was my responsibility. And that's basically true to the extent that, you
know, the campaign person should be, take the load if things don't go well. But I thought that
he was much too willing to forgive this kind of thing, when if it were a substantive issue he
wouldn't have forgiven any part of it, okay? But it was, there was a disconnect between the real
Ed Muskie and the campaign Ed Muskie, and I saw it. I saw it in Los Angeles, I saw it in
Miami, where we were used, and I got pretty hardened by the time we got done, and so did
Arnold, and we made changes as we went. But we were sort of running out of money, I mean, it
was just that simple. And Ed just didn't focus on it. He did, but he didn't. He did focus on it in a
sense, but not with the focus of I must do something, I must commit, I must do what they’re all
telling me.
Arnold and I had met with Ed once a week to say please, we've got to free the schedule up. And
you know how Arnold was, he was always pleading, he was always, he was about as nice a
person as you will ever meet, and only cared about Ed as the president. That's what he saw, that
this was going to make a different country, that's what Arnold saw. And he used to get so
frustrated and say, “We've got to have more, we’ve got to get more money, and we’ve got to do
this.” And Ed just, that was not him.
DN: Arnold, you said earlier, was very direct with Ed. Was his directness pleading, or was he
direct in telling him what he thought was wrong with -?

BB: It was a combination. He was a good pleader, because he was so nice about it, but at the
same time he was quite direct about what he thought needed to be done. And, you know, he was
so supportive of my efforts to, and he would try to support the dispute, you know, when we had a
dispute about, it was a scheduling thing, you know. Ed hated it. He hated the fact that there's no
white space, that what we were doing was miniscule in terms of importance. It was not his
moment of interest. And no matter how Arnold would try to cajole him, try to convince him that
there was no way to go ahead if we were bankrupt, and we'd be out of money and all. And Ed
knew that, but it was just, it was, he couldn't really relate well to it. He didn't like it.
It was, let me tell you, I mean, I don't know how we're going to deal with some of this, but we
had a meeting in the (Blackstone?) Hotel, in Chicago, during the campaign. And I was told in
advance that there was a Polish-American who wanted to give Ed a lot of money. Well, I said I'd
have to meet him first, I wasn't going to have him blindly talk to Ed unless I knew more about
him. And we did, we ran down a few things, and I thought slightly questionable, but certainly
very wealthy. So I decided, considering, and I talked to Arnold about it, considering the
superficial support we had financially and the rather tenuous nature of our effort in this regard,
that okay, I'll, I think there’s something here. And I talked to him, I think he said he was going
to pledge twenty-five thousand dollars, and he'd give us ten thousand dollars up front. And that
was munificent.
So I brought him in to see Ed. And it was, oh, maybe nine o'clock at night but Ed had been out
campaigning and speaking all over at Cook county before. This fellow was, you wouldn't find
him particularly desirable, to someone you'd want to spend the evening with. But at that point I
was . . . . So we come in there and Ed has his shoes off, and he's sitting on the edge of his bed. I
introduced him and said, this fellow wanted to be of some support to us, it was significant, that's
why I told Ed about him in advance. First thing out of his mouth is, “Sir, I know you'll enjoy
this, I want to tell you this Polish joke.” And I had this feeling, I just, my stomach just turned
and I thought, “Oh, my God.” And there was silence for a second, and he started to tell it. And
you know how careful Ed was about trying to be disciplined about these things, and suddenly
there was silence. And this fellow could see that Ed, I just looked in his face and I said, “Oh
God, this is bad news.” And that was when he [Ed] came out with his one and only, he looked at
this guy and said, “What color are my shoes? Have you heard this one? Yeah. It's from kicking
the crap out of people who tell Polish jokes.”
Well, that ended the contribution. And I escorted him out very quickly, just really embarrassed,
and Ed was furious, you know, that I had allowed this to occur. And I, and it was my fault, I
mean, but I thought I'd run enough to not believe for a second this guy was so crude as to do
something like that.
But to me it was symptomatic of the problems we had. You know, we would reach for any kind
of jagged effort to get money in the till, and Arnold knew we couldn't get it organized, we
couldn't get it done, Ed didn't want to provide for it. And there was no way you'd do it without
him, you know. I'd try to find surrogates, you may remember this effort of finding surrogates
from Harold Hughes to whoever it might be that would speak for him at fund raisers. And they
didn't want to hear surrogates. If they were going to contribute big money, they wanted to meet

the candidate. And it was the kind of thing that I knew that the Kennedys did better than
anybody I'd ever seen. I mean they understood the mother's milk, and they wanted to have
money in the till and they just did it, you know, they, substantive issues were not quite as
important. They made them sound like they were, but they weren't. Getting elected was what
was important, and that was not number one in Ed's psyche. He had issues on his brain. And so
these, these gnawing unpleasantness of raising money and organizing and all that kind of thing
just didn't work easily. That's all I can say.
DN: One little question of fact in connection with this fellow in Chicago. You said he had
Polish ancestry?
BB: And so it would have, you know, and when he first started . . . . Ed knew it because I had
told Ed that he was, you know, his ancestry was Poland, that he was a second generation and he
was active in the Polish-American Alliance, some kind of business alliance. And so I thought,
you know, okay, this is going to be comfortable, this is going to be easy. And the sonofabitch
starts out like that. And I said, “Oh, I'm leaving.” I mean, Ed was furious, I mean furious. It
wasn't like casual. Because he wouldn't do that kind of thing to others he didn't know, I mean, it
wasn't in his psyche. But he sure did it. And I just, I'm sure he'd used that before but it was the
first time I ever heard it.
DN:

The only time I ever heard it was to staff.

BB:

Is that right?

DN:

Yeah, and close staff.

BB: Oh, okay. Well this was a, try to picture it, o.k.? Needless to say, we didn't get the ten
and we didn't get the twenty-five. That was a difficult, that was a hard, that was very hard.
DN: Let's look at another aspect of that campaign and then we'll come back to the question of
organization and how it evolved. And that is the forays into foreign policy, and particularly the
trip to Europe, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union. And why don't we start with that, because
there are other questions about BB: Well, okay, kind of a standard, I guess in those days, was you have to establish the
credentials that he really understood foreign policy. And it was rather superficial and childish
but I guess the politics of it were compelling, and that was that he had to go overseas and meet a
lot of people and show that he really knew people and they respected and responded to him. And
so we arranged this trip to go to London and go to Germany, and go to Cairo and Israel and all
the rest of it, well, and to Moscow. Well, it was, we didn't have the money for it to start with.
And there was this wonderful man, John Clifford Folger, who had once been chairman of the
finance committee for Eisenhower and the Republican National Committee. He didn't like
Richard Nixon. And he paid for that, frankly, and made it possible for us to do that.
The trip was a, I think, mixed politically and spectacular in terms of looking at Senator Muskie
as someone who really had an instinct for foreign policy. I really saw him at a different level,

both at the meetings in London, and then we were caught in a big storm and didn't go to
Germany and ended up going, I guess, first to Israel. And he really handled all of it without
missing a beat, it was, he just seemed to have an instinct to work with and to connect with people
who were leading other countries.
When we were in Israel, I don't know if you knew about the problems. The prime minister, he
loved her, and they had a very good relationship. And I was concerned that we were getting, in
the crudest sense, sucked in to the internal politics of Israel to the point that we weren't getting a
real sense of what was necessary to both protect the country, or sustain its security, and also have
a country that was not totally militaristic, which was the impression I certainly had when we
were there. And he was having all these meetings with the prime minister and all the rest there.
I decided on my own that I had to get another point of view, because he was really enamored of
what he was being told by this wonderful woman. And I had heard that there was a fellow
named Begin who was nipping at her heels and that he wanted to take over the world, I guess, or
certainly wanted to conquer Egypt.
And, well in any event, the upshot of it was I went to an apartment where he lived to talk to him
one night. And Golda Meir heard of that. And I guess I misunderstood and didn't properly
evaluate the capability of the Mossad and their intelligence operation. And the next morning I
was to be with Ed to meet with Golda Meir, and she started the meeting with just blasting me for
having gone to this riotous, warmongering, blah-blah-blah. And when I finished that evening
talking to Begin I said, “Holy God, he was talking about how we have to take over Cairo and
we need new missiles and all of this. But Ed's response to that was, at the moment, while she
was there, he said, “We'll talk about that later.” And, you know, I knew that this was really a
problem. And the Prime Minister said, “I hope that you will. This is very serious.” Well, we
got back and Ed bellowed, he was livid. “You didn't clear it with me, you . . . .” [tape ends]
End of Side B
End of Interview

